Only recently has English-language scholarship recognized the diversity of foreign policy actors-within and beyond the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the government and the military-which influence and often shape Chinese diplomacy (Jakobson and Knox 2010; Breslin 2013) . Among these newly recognized actors, Chinese provinces have received increasingly more attention. Yet, their paradiplomacy 1 , defined as subnational involvement (independently of or in concert with the central government) in international relations in pursuit of specific interests, whether economic, political or ideational, remains poorly understood.
Some scholars either deny Chinese provinces' engagement in defence or foreign policy issues (Zheng 2007, 66) or consider them of marginal importance (Jakobson and Knox 2010, 32) .
Others go so far as to suggest that provinces' international linkages signify the declining relevance of national political boundaries for economic change (Breslin 2000, 205-6) or transform one China into 'many Chinese parts facing various worlds' (Womack 2009, 7) .
Sporadic studies examining-often implicitly-Chinese subnational paradiplomacy consider
Chinese provinces as either agents or partners of the central government. Those denying provincial 'actorness' focus either on Beijing's instrumental use of provinces as agents to further its own particular geostrategic objectives in selected (primarily neighbouring) regions or on economic benefits provinces derive from China's relations with neighbouring economies (Dosch and Hensengerth 2005, 274-5; Cheng 2013, 328; Zhang and Tang 2005, 52-53; Zhao 2010, 374; Chen and Stone 2013; Summers 2013, 177-197) . Others acknowledge provinces' economic self-interest in engaging in foreign relations, yet classify them as the central government's junior partners, delegated to implement Beijing's regional (mostly economic) strategies or requiring Beijing's consent for their external activities (Su 2010; Xiong and Wen, 2009, 23; Harris 2002) .
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Still others insist on a symbiotic central-subnational state relationship: Provinces act as the central government's pro-active partners on foreign policy issues and exploit opportunities created by Chinese diplomacy to maximize their economic interests. In turn, the central state creates space for provincial external relations by tasking subnational government with duties to promote relations with neighbouring countries (Cheung and Tang 2001) . Calling it 'the central-local alliance' (Su, 2013a (Su, : 1217 , Su (2012a; 2012b : 1329 suggests that Beijing deliberately de-emphasizes its centralized power structure to create a 'networked regional governance' to facilitate provincial development (of Yunnan) by integrating it into a transnational economy (Southeast Asia). For Chen et al. (2010, 335) , the rise of local and subnational foreign policy actors in China indicates the (re)emergence of a new multi-layered foreign policy system in China.
This article argues that both the motivations driving provincial foreign relations and centralprovincial partnerships on foreign policy issues are a lot more complex than thus far assumed.
At the core of this argument is that central-provincial collaboration on foreign policy issues creates new forms of influence and instruments, which enable provinces to lay claim to domestic political and economic resources and opportunities, while at the same time carving out an international identity. In short, the participation in external relations-underpinned by central-substate coordination-allows provinces to carry out specific political and economic projects internally as well as externally that contribute to a process of provincial state building.
Provincial state building is defined here not in terms of institutional or legal restructuring, but as a market-building, developmentalist undertaking pursued by the provincial leadership in 'productivity coalitions' with national and subnational political and social interests in the domestic and international spheres (Sbragia 2000) . It is this dynamic involving 4 | P a g e developmentalist economic project at the subnational level and its ostensibly international dimension that this paper considers as the defining feature of Chinese paradiplomacy.
More specifically, this article focuses on Yunnan, China's Southwestern province, and its relations with the countries grouped in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand. In 1992, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) involved Yunnan and these five riparian countries in a GMS Economic Cooperation Programme, with the ostensible aim of facilitating cross-border trade and investment, and enhancing the connectivity and competitiveness of regional economies (OPE-ADB 2008, 1) .
To date, the ADB's GMS Programme represents one of the best documented case studies of
Chinese provincial involvement in a cross-border cooperative framework. 
The Politics of Subnational Foreign Relations
Classical and structural Realism have anthropomorphized the state as a unitary rational actor operating in an anarchic setting, in which the government speaks on behalf of all of its 7 | P a g e component parts with one legitimate voice (Morgenthau 1997, 5; Waltz 1986, 338-339) .
Literature on diplomacy has similarly assumed states to be 'natural' and bounded containers for political activity, interaction among which represents 'high politics' as an exclusive realm reserved for territorial units mutually recognizing one another as sovereign states (McConnel, Moreau and Dittmer 2012, 804) . The classical notion of state sovereignty has partly informed this unitary actor approach by acting as an organizing principle differentiating principal actors in the international arena (namely, sovereign states) from other territorial and non-territorial entities.
In the 1980s, an increasing awareness of globalization raised doubts among some scholars about the states' capacity to independently control transborder movements of people, goods, capital, ideas, or their centrality to transnational companies (Strange 1996 (Strange , 1999 Camilleri and Falk 1992, 4-6) . Although Institutional Liberals have considered state sovereignty as a constitutive principle of the international system and an 'institutional' fact (Keohane 1984, 25; 2003, 148) (Krasner 2001, 9) . In doing so, they departed from a model of a single authority governing each territory and representing it outside its borders. Susan Strange (1996) called it the 'retreat of the state'. It is in this context that the first studies of subnational-a.k.a. parallel (para)-diplomacy emerged in the 1980s.
8 | P a g e Scholars of paradiplomacy, while agreeing with Liberal analyses of globalization, focused on the states' declining capacity for 'territorial management' (Keating 1999, 2-3) . In his pioneering study, Duchacek (1984, 8&11) characterised central governments as not only 'rather ignorant or neglectful of the borderlands' interests and needs', but also no longer capable of supporting subnational welfare and economies. As a result, subnational unitsaware of 'universal interdependence'-had to turn to the outside world for investments and export markets in order to maintain their economic wellbeing (Duchacek 1984, 8&15) .
Numerous scholars broadly agreed with Duchacek (Fry 1988, 63-4; Soldatos and Michelmann 1992, 132) . More recently Cornago (2010, 18) , Michelmann (2009a, 3) , Criekemans and Duran (2010, 39) , for example, asserted that by removing the barriers to trade and investments and, thereby, affecting local communities and their autonomy, globalization prompted substate governments to become players on the international stage and compete internationally in order to 'recuperate some of the influence which they lost as a result of globalization'.
Subnational units' foreign relations- Duchacek (1988, 5) argued-signified both respect and disrespect for sovereign boundaries. As subnational units either attempted to influence national foreign policy decision-making through domestic political channels or by-passed central governments by seeking trans-sovereign contacts with foreign (national or constituent) governments, they potentially challenged-to borrow from Krasner's typology [1999, [3] [4] )-domestic sovereignty, namely, the organization of political authority within a state and state authorities' control of the polity. Blatter (2001, 176) called it 'debordering the world of states'.
In such cases, when foreign governments sought relations with subnational actors of other countries, those countries' Westphalian sovereignty (namely, the exclusion of external actors, de facto or de jure, from domestic authority structures) was potentially at stake as well. The 9 | P a g e paradiplomacy scholarship features no consensus on the central states' responses to substates' projections into the international scene. Some argue that all central governments seek to limit and control substates' foreign activism (Fry 2009, 312; Keating 1999, 12-13; Lecours 2002, 95; Tierney 2005, 171) . Others, however, note central governments' varied responses to paradiplomacy that reflect the Liberal distinction between Westphalian and post-modern states. Paradiplomacy studies have focused primarily on post-modern federal states, in which subnational units pro-actively engaged in foreign relations. They largely ignore unitary Westphalian states, chief among them China, which is conventionally characterised as a 'conservative power' with a 'rather traditional' approach to sovereignty that seeks to 'reaffirm sovereignty and internal autonomy against challenges from evolving concepts of human rights, domestic governance, and humanitarian intervention' (Johnston 2003, 14-15; Kang 2007, 79; Buzan 2010, 14) . Beijing's alleged attachment to the classical conception of Westphalia and its aversion to 'the very notion of genuine international interdependence' (Segal 1999, 33) might suggest its opposition to any form of provincial paradiplomacy. Yet, this is not the case. In the Mao era, some of this involvement was ceremonial: provincial leaders hosted foreign ambassadors and dignitaries, with whom they discussed questions of global or regional importance or, since 1972, forged friendship city relationships (Jersild 2014, 143; Chen et al., 2010, 347) . Occasionally, provincial involvement became more substantial. They partially bankrolled China's war effort in Korea and Vietnam, as well as border conflicts with India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam (Cheung and Tang 2001, 101&106) . They also played a role in China's informal diplomacy (Jain 2005, 75-6) .
During the reform period, Chinese provinces continued to receive foreign guests, cultivate friendly relations with foreign cities and provinces, oversee border exchanges, host international conferences and world events and, on rare occasions, perform sensitive diplomatic tasks (Cheung and Tang, 2001: 105-106; Chen et al., 2010: 347; Cheng 2010, 411) . Gradually, however, their external activities became equally (if not more) concerned with promoting provincial exports, seeking foreign direct investments (FDI) and supervising foreign-invested enterprises (Cheung and Tang 2001, 99, 101) . These overseas economic activities are the main reason behind the emerging scholarship on Chinese provinces as subnational foreign policy actors (Segal 2002) .
Chinese provincial interest and-more importantly-capacity to engage in economic relations with foreign countries and territories resulted from two strategies introduced by the Deng Xiaoping regime in the early 1980s, namely, fiscal decentralization and export-led development. The former stimulated provinces' fiscal resourcefulness by allowing them to keep a proportion of their income (Zhao and Zhang 1999, 257) . While benefiting primarily coastal provinces (Zhao and Zhang, 1999, 270) , it turned provinces into semi-autonomous decision-makers dependent on their own revenues (Li and Wu 2012, 56) , and competing with the central government over direct control for local economic resources and greater regulatory powers (Li 2010) . The 'open door policy' complemented fiscal decentralization by channelling a disproportionate share of FDI to coastal provinces (Ho and Li 2008, 256; Li and Wu 2012, 65) . The central government also allocated most of its domestic investments in the coastal areas (Zhao and Zhang 1999, 269) . Regionally-biased fiscal investments, FDI and decentralization led to the sharply widening wealth gap between the coast and the inland, which neither the 1994 fiscal reform nor the post-1999 Western Development Programme managed to bridge (Zhao and Zhang 1999; Sheng 2009, 78; Ho and Li 2008, 257 (Hinton 1998, 10; Chen 2005, 203; Lu 2013, 103) . Economically, the interaction between Southeast Asia and the territories now associated with Yunnan-first as a trading frontier on the Southern Silk road-dates back to the 2 nd century BCE (Bin 2009, 33-34) . Since the late 18 th century, Yunnan also actively engaged in trade with Siam (Chen 2005, 201-202 (Zhao 1996, 147 ). Yunnan's relative economic underdevelopment, which is particularly pronounced in the areas populated by the ethnic minorities that in the past rebelled against Chinese imperial and communist regimes (Guo 2008, 223-230) , could explain Yunnanese officials' early excitement about the GMS project: the ADB-sponsored programme held promise of injecting badly needed funds into provincial infrastructure development and linking the province to the economies of the entire GMS. Chen et al. (2010, 350) suggest that, in the early 1990s, the Chinese central government's interest in the GMS project was at best lukewarm, while Swain (2002, 199) mentions Beijing's concerns that the economic pull of Southeast Asia could enhance Yunnan's 'independence from the centre'. It was Yunnan's enthusiasm-manifested during the first GMS conference held in Manila in December 1992, where the provincial government emphasized transport infrastructure as a precursor to economic development-that allegedly prevailed (Chen et al. 2010, 350; Chen 2011, 192 Beijing's agreements on mutual degree recognition with Thailand (2007), the Philippines (2009) and Vietnam (2009); as well as a Chinese government scholarship programme for over 3,000
Southeast Asian students (Zeng et al. 2013, 338) has helped boost the number of GMS students in Yunnan. Yunnanese authorities hope to attract 100,000 foreign students by 2016 (Li et al. 2011 ).
20 | P a g e to its proximity to the Golden Triangle, Yunnan was exposed to drug trafficking and suffered from one of the highest levels of drug use in China (Hinton 1998, 16-17 (Liu 2012: 9) . Yunnan-based companies dominated the programme (NDRC et al. 2008; NDRC et al. 2011; Liu 2012, 10&13; Su 2012b Su , 1342 . They received subsidies from the central government, import tax and VAT waivers, and permission to import crops produced under the scheme. Such a permission was normally difficult to obtain due to set quotas. The China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation covered Yunnanese investors' activities by a special insurance programme (NDRC et al. 2008; Transnational Institute 2010) . Despite official emphasis on the diversity of crops planted under the scheme (NDRC et al. 2011) , rubber trees were planted in more than half of the areas (Liu 2012, 10) .
While failing to stop drug trafficking in Yunnan (Jin 2013) , the opium replacement policy helped the Yunnan government convert some under-performing provincial rubber plantations back to natural forest (Ives 2013) , as well as supported provincial investments in the GMS.
Scholarly estimates of these investments range from CNY500 million in Myanmar alone from the early 1990s to 2009 (Zhu 2009, 81) There is a general consensus regarding the rapid growth of Yunnan's outbound investments into the GMS (Su 2012b (Su , 1341 Summers 2013, 161&164; Lu 2013, 106) 
